Legal Eye & Acumen.

The Supreme Court on Monday suggested thatStates and Union Territories should consider linking unpaid traffic challans to electricity bills as a way of recovering outstanding fines [S Rajaseekaran v. Union of India & Ors.].

A Bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice KV Viswanathan made the suggestion while hearing a plea concerning the electronic enforcement of traffic violations and recovery of unpaid e-challan fines.

Justice Pardiwala held that the authorities needed to look beyond merely issuing e-challans, and should focus on recovering the fines.

> “It is not just sufficient to keep issuing e-challans. Police may issue thousands and lakhs of such e-challans. Question is recovery of fines as sought to be imposed by way of the e-challans,” said Justice Pardiwala.

The Court then suggested that unpaid traffic fines could be added to electricity dues so that defaulters would have an additional incentive to clear them.

> “If people are not paying traffic challans, add it to their electricity dues bill. They’ll have to pay electricity bills else power line will be disconnected. Work it out. In this country, you have to find a way out,” said the Court.

The suggestion came after the Court was informed that States and Union Territories have to recover around ₹45,000 crore towards e-challans, of which approximately ₹25,000 crore has been recovered so far.

Against this backdrop, the Court discussed a range of measures that could be adopted to ensure recovery of unpaid e-challan fines.

These included preventing the renewal of registration certificates, issuance of duplicate certificates and changes in ownership details until all outstanding challans were cleared.

The Court also suggested blacklisting vehicles with unpaid challans on the Parivahan portal and blocking ownership transfers. It further discussed withholding fitness and Pollution Under Control (PUC) certificates for such vehicles, as well as preventing renewal of driving licences and taking steps to suspend licences already in force.

Emphasising that these measures should be effective on the ground, Justice Pardiwala said,

> “The authorities need to work at the ground level having regard to ground realities.”

Additionally, the Court also suggested random checks of vehicles to identify those against which e-challans remained unpaid.

> “Let there be random checking of vehicles and if found that e-challan has not been honoured necessary steps to be taken to impound the vehicle itself,” said the Court.

The suggestions were made while hearing an application seeking directions for the implementation of electronic enforcement mechanisms under Section 136A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read with Rule 167A of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.

The application was heard as part of a long-running public interest litigation petition on road safety filed in 2012 by Coimbatore-based orthopaedic surgeon S Rajaseekaran. The petition seeks coordinated measures to reduce road accidents and improve infrastructure and post-accident care.

Over the years, the Court has passed several directions in the matter concerning road safety and enforcement of the Motor Vehicles Act.

In August 2025, the Court said it would also consider issuing directions for the creation of portals to facilitate payment of compensation to victims of road accidents.

In October last year, the Court had ordered all States and Union Territories to frame rules to ensure pedestrian safety and regulate the movement of non-motorised vehicles such as cycles and hand carts in public spaces.

More recently, in May this year, the Court directed States and UTs to strictly implement Rule 125H of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, which requires public service vehicles to be equipped with vehicle location tracking devices (VLTDs) and emergency/panic buttons.

It also directed that no public service vehicle be granted a fitness certificate or transport permit unless the required devices were installed.

The Court further directed States to retrofit these devices in existing public service vehicles and integrate their installation and functionality with the Vahan database.

In the broader proceedings, the Court questioned whether its directions over nearly 14 years have translated into results on the ground.

> “We want to know from the learned amicus (Senior Advocate Gaurav Agarwal) as to what is the position that the ground level we will keep issuing directions for an indefinite period of time, but if all these directions are going to remain on paper and are not going to be implemented by the authorities, then one fine day we may have to take some stern action which may not be liked by the authorities,” asked the Court.

The Court accordingly asked the amicus curiae, Senior Advocate Gaurav Agarwal, to prepare a chart setting out the directions issued, the time given for implementation, their current status and the amicus' remarks.

The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has held that an order modifying an interim direction in a pending writ petition, while keeping the substantive issues open for adjudication, does not constitute a “judgment” within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and is therefore not amenable to an intra-court appeal.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Sindhu Sharma and Justice Shahzad Azeem made the observation while dismissing an LPA filed by M/s Jai Sukrala Trading Co. against an order permitting the Army authorities to proceed with and finalise a defence tender, subject to the outcome of the pending writ petition.

The Bench held that the Single Judge had neither decided the legality of the appellant's technical disqualification nor finally determined any of the allegations concerning the tender process. The order merely modified an earlier interim restraint while expressly keeping the tender finalisation subject to the result of the writ petition.

Background:

The appellant, a proprietorship concern engaged in supplying fencing, electrification, solar and allied structural works to Army units under the 25 Infantry Division/16 Corps, had participated in nine open tender enquiries floated by the 59 Engineer Regiment. The tenders concerned the realignment of IAIOS/AOIS at multiple stretches in the Naushera-Jhangar sector and connected works.

A corrigendum issued shortly before the original bid-submission deadline required bidders to physically submit a sample of a “Solar Cube Generator-cum-Invertor” at the Technical Evaluation Committee stage.

The appellant was subsequently declared “rejected-technical” in all nine tenders on grounds including non-submission of BIS/ISO certificates, alleged failure to submit the sample within time, non-conformity of the sample and failure to establish that the offered product did not infringe a patent.

The appellant challenged the rejection before the Single Judge, seeking, inter alia, re-evaluation by a duly constituted Technical Evaluation Committee, opening of its financial bid and restraint against finalisation of the tender.

On August 3, 2026, the writ court directed that opening of the financial bid be deferred. Subsequently, after the respondents informed the Court that the financial bids had already been opened and rate analysis was underway, the Single Judge modified the interim order on August 13, permitting the respondents to proceed with and finalise the bidding process.

The finalisation, however, was expressly made subject to the outcome of the writ petition and the successful bidder was prohibited from claiming equity on the basis of the action taken pursuant to the order.

Before the Division Bench, the appellant argued that the Single Judge had not returned any finding on its eligibility and had also failed to deal with its allegations concerning the manner in which competing bidders were cleared.

It was contended that the corrigendum altering the tender specifications shortly before the original deadline was “tailored-made” and vitiated by mala fides. The appellant also raised allegations concerning pooled samples, BIS certification and the eligibility of certain competing bidders.

On that basis, it was argued that the August 13 order had effectively taken away the protection earlier granted by the writ court and affected the appellant's valuable right to compete, thereby making the order a “judgment” appealable under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

Rejecting the maintainability challenge, the Division Bench noted that the writ petition continued to remain pending. The Single Judge had neither upheld nor quashed the appellant's technical rejection or the corrigendum. Nor had the Court finally determined whether the appellant was technically qualified or disqualified, the court stated.

The Bench noted,

“It has not finally declared the appellant technically qualified or disqualified.”

Similarly, the allegations concerning cartelisation, tailored specifications, absence of the Technical Evaluation Committee and discrimination had all been left open for adjudication in the main writ petition, the court said

The Bench accordingly characterised the impugned order as a balancing of competing equities rather than a final determination of rights.

“What is discernible, therefore, is that the writ Court order under challenge is a classic example of balancing of equities and is not a disposal of the application for interim relief in the sense of a final determination of rights.”, remarked Justice Azeem authoring the judgement.

Modification Of Interim Restraint Is Ordinary Interlocutory Exercise

The Division Bench also rejected the argument that modification of the earlier interim order amounted, in substance, to its final and irreversible disposal. The Court explained that an interim order remains capable of being modified or moulded by subsequent orders during the pendency of the same proceeding.

“An interim order merges in, and remains capable of being moulded by, later orders in the same proceeding.”

The Bench further observed that treating every modification of an interim direction as a “judgment” under Clause 12 would effectively convert the Division Bench into a first appellate court against every interlocutory direction of a Single Judge.

The Court also noted that the writ court had expressly preserved the appellant's substantive challenge by making the tender finalisation subject to the outcome of the writ petition and by restraining the successful bidder from claiming equity.

“An order that keeps the petition alive, keeps every substantial issue open, and only refuses to halt an ongoing tender, does not determine vital rights with finality.”

Clause 12 Requires Determination Of A Right Or Issue

Referring to Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania and Midnapore Peoples' Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda, the Bench reiterated that while a “judgment” under Clause 12 may be final, preliminary or intermediary, it must carry an element of finality and determine some right or issue between the parties.

Routine interlocutory orders which do not determine such rights, therefore, do not fall within the expression “judgment”, the court emphasised.

The Bench held that the appellant's complaint that the Single Judge had not recorded point-wise findings on every certificate or document of competing bidders misconceived the nature of the order.

The writ court was not deciding the writ petition finally; it was only deciding whether the defence tender should remain frozen pending adjudication of the writ petition. Since the disputed issues were expressly reserved for the main proceedings, absence of issue-wise findings at that stage was not a legal infirmity.

Court Cannot Sit In Appeal Over Technical Evaluation Committee

The Division Bench also reiterated the limited scope of judicial review in tender matters. It observed that judicial review concerns the decision-making process and not a re-trial of the Technical Evaluation Committee's decision.

“The Court does not sit in appeal over the Technical Evaluation Committee.”

The Bench added that where technical issues are involved, judicial restraint is greater and technical evaluation or comparison by the Court is impermissible.

The Court also took note of the operational character of the procurement, observing that the tender related to realignment works on the Line of Control in the Naushera-Jhangar sector, undertaken pursuant to directions concerning operational readiness after “OP Sindoor”.

It held that defence procurement concerning operational works could not be halted merely on a vendor's claim that it would have emerged as L-1 if permitted to participate in the financial bid.

The Division Bench ultimately held that the August 13, 2026 order was not a “judgment” within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.

“It is a discretionary modification of an interim direction in a pending writ petition, with the lis kept alive and equity expressly balanced.”, the court said and dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal

J&K Government Creates 4 Exclusive Special Courts for NDPS Cases, Sanctions 40 Posts.

The Patna High Court has held that merely participating in a tender process “under protest” does not justify a subsequent challenge to the tender conditions after the bidder's bid has been rejected.

A Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma was hearing a writ petition filed by Adyaraj Developers Pvt. Ltd. challenging an eligibility condition prescribed in tenders floated by the Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Limited for construction of rail over bridges.

The petitioner had objected to the tender condition prescribing the financial years 2020-21 to 2024-25 for assessing experience, while the annual financial turnover requirement referred to 2019-20 to 2023-24. It contended that the Standard Bidding Document required the “last five years” to be considered uniformly.

Before participating in the tender, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 25.04.2025 challenging the condition. Since no decision was taken on the representation, it participated in the tender, claiming that it had done so under protest. The petitioner's technical bid was subsequently rejected for not satisfying the prescribed experience criteria. It thereafter approached the High Court challenging the eligibility condition.

The respondents opposed the challenge, contending that the petitioner, having knowingly participated in the tender process despite being aware of the eligibility requirements, could not question those conditions after its bid was rejected.

The High Court held that the petitioner's participation “under protest” did not alter the legal position. The Court observed:

“Merely because the petitioner had submitted a representation or allegedly participated under protest does not alter the legal position. Such representation, or participation under protest cannot, by itself, invalidate the tender process nor can it confer upon the petitioner a right to seek annulment of the process after the result has gone against it.”

The Court noted that the petitioner had been aware of the eligibility conditions before submitting its bid and had consciously chosen to participate in the process. Its contention that it would have been eligible had a different financial period been prescribed was essentially a challenge to the eligibility condition itself.

The Bench further held that the petitioner could not be permitted to “approbate and reprobate” or “blow hot and cold in the same breath” after voluntarily participating in the tender process.

The Court also declined to interfere with the tender authority's decision on the eligibility criteria, reiterating that judicial review does not ordinarily permit the Court to substitute its own view for the commercial or technical wisdom of the tendering authority.

Finding no material to establish that the impugned condition was arbitrary, discriminatory or designed to favour a particular bidder, the High Court dismissed the writ petition.

The Supreme Court on Tuesday questioned the huge difference between the price at which medicines are sold by manufacturers to retailers and the maximum retail price (MRP) printed on them, observing that allowing a medicine bought for Rs 2,700 to be sold at an MRP of Rs 27,000 amounted to “extortion”.

“If that is not extortion, what else it is? People sell their houses, people sell their ornaments for getting the medicines” Justice Sandeep Mehta remarked during the hearing of petitions seeking regulation of medicine prices.

“There are medicines, essential medicines for cancer, which the MRP is 27,000 and the PTR (Price To Retailer) is 2700. That's absolute rampage, carnage with the...absolute dacoity, broad daylight dacoity. How a patient can be cheated for a medicine, which the manufacturer sells to the retailer at 2700, The MRP is printed at 27,000? Ten times! It is very surprising that the authorities who are supposed to take the decision on this are absolutely silent. We need not spell out the reason for that” Justice Mehta said.
The Court noted that medicines were sold to retailers at a fraction of their printed MRP and questioned why manufacturers should be permitted to fix MRPs several times higher than the actual sale price. “Why this disparity at all? A medicine which is, as a matter of fact, sold by the manufacturer to the retailer at 10% of its MRP, why it has got this high MRP? Why should there be such disparity?” Justice Mehta asked.

A bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Vikram Nath made the observations while hearing petitions filed by Kishan Chand Jain and Dr Sanjay Kulshresthra concerning regulation of medicine prices, generic medicines, medical devices and prescription practices.

Arguments

Jain, appearing in person, submitted that the central issue was the absence of regulation over the initial price fixation of non-scheduled medicines under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 2013. The DPCO fixes ceiling prices for medicines in Schedule I, containing around 1,000 medicines, but does not regulate the initial price fixed by manufacturers for non-scheduled medicines. The only restriction is that the manufacturer cannot subsequently increase that price by more than 10%.

“For instance, a manufacturer wants to launch a medicine today. It can fix one rupee, it can fix 1,000 rupees. There is no regulatory regime to control the price fixation. Only after he has fixed it, then there is a restriction that he cannot increase it more than 10%,” he said.

Jain submitted that around 82% of medicines are non-scheduled. He further submitted that there are around 60,000 brands in the market, while the price-fixation mechanism covers fewer than 5,000. By value, he submitted, around 83% of medicines are non-scheduled and 17% are scheduled.

This, he said, allows manufacturers to fix high initial prices and creates room for large margins for retailers and healthcare establishments.

He referred to documents showing large differences between MRP and the price to retailer, including a medicine with an MRP of Rs 73 and a price to retailer of Rs 22.75, and another with an MRP of Rs 61 and a price to retailer of Rs 9.65.

Jain submitted that the DPCO requires manufacturers to issue price lists to dealers and retailers to display them. Justice Mehta questioned whether this would help patients who needed medicines urgently, while Justice Nath observed that an attendant buying medicines in such circumstances would not necessarily stop to obtain the price list and compare the price to retailer with the MRP. Jain responded that disclosure could put pressure on retailers and hospitals, but agreed that the larger question was why such a disparity existed at all.

Jain responded that disclosure would at least put pressure on retailers and hospitals, but agreed that the larger question was why such a disparity should exist in the first place. He alleged that the NPPA had the data about the price to retailer and price to stockist of medicines but did not make the relevant figures available on its portal.

Jain also challenged the legal basis for distinguishing between scheduled and non-scheduled medicines. Referring to Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and Section 2A of the Essential Commodities Act, he submitted that medicines had become essential commodities after the 2007 amendment and that the statutory definition of “drug” did not distinguish between scheduled and non-scheduled medicines.

He relied on a Parliamentary Standing Committee report which observed that a medicine becomes essential to a person suffering from the disease for which it is formulated. He therefore argued that the distinction under the DPCO did not take into account the 2007 amendment.

He also disputed the Department of Pharmaceuticals' position that essential medicines are those which are cost-effective for indications affecting the health needs of the majority, arguing that this approach leaves out patients suffering from less common diseases. He submitted that a medicine needed for treating a particular disease was essential to the patient suffering from that disease, regardless of how commonly it was used.

Justice Mehta also highlighted an anomaly arising from the classification of medicines as scheduled and non-scheduled. He referred to Rasuvas, a commonly used statin, and observed that a strip costs around Rs. 240 because it is a non-scheduled drug and is therefore not subject to the DPCO's price control. However, when Rasuvas is combined with aspirin, the combination falls within the scheduled category and the same strip costs around Rs 70.

“So a combination should be more costly. It should be costlier, but the disparity is there. It's a very commonly used drug,” he observed.

Jain further sought regulation of medical-device prices, submitting that the government had notified all medical devices intended for use in humans or animals as “drugs” under Section 3(b)(iv) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act from April 1, 2020. He argued that medical devices also carry large markups and required a price-fixation mechanism.

He also explained that the ceiling price for scheduled medicines is calculated using the prices of companies with at least 1% market share, with an average being worked out and a 16% retailer margin added.

Dr Sanjay Kulshresthra, appearing in person in the connected petition, supported the challenge to the pricing regime. Referring to paragraph 19 of the DPCO, he submitted that the government could, in extraordinary circumstances and in public interest, fix the retail ceiling price of any drug for such period as it considered necessary.

He placed before the Court a table showing differences between printed prices and actual sale prices, including one medicine with a printed price of Rs 4,196 that was available for Rs 980. He also referred to antibiotic TG-BEX and submitted that the disparity between its printed price and sale price was 1,500%.

He submitted that antibiotics were particularly expensive and that excessive margins could encourage their promotion, at a time when the country was facing the problem of antimicrobial resistance.

He also explained the difference between traditional chemists and corporate hospitals. He submitted that some chemists may forego part of their margin, but corporate hospitals often require patients to purchase medicines from their own hospital stores and charge the full MRP.

He argued that this disproportionately affects poor patients, who may have no practical choice when treatment is being provided in a hospital.

Justice Mehta noted that the problem also affected government-funded treatment because the higher price would ultimately be reimbursed from public funds.

“There is one more factor. Many patients are now getting treatment under the PM, GSY, Ayushman Bharat. So, ultimately, it's the taxpayer's money which goes into all this. Because the medicine, which is supposed to be sold for 200 rupees, is dispensed for 2,000 rupees. The hospital gets the reimbursement, and the taxpayer pays it. Government is paying and it is ultimately the taxpayer's money. All government services are. This is a clear-cut case of fraud on the face of it”, he said.
Kulshresthra also addressed generic medicines. He submitted that doctors supported the use of generic medicines because they could make treatment cheaper, but there were concerns about quality and reliability that needed to be addressed before generic prescribing could work effectively.

He argued that when a doctor prescribes a generic medicine without specifying a brand, the choice of manufacturer is effectively transferred to the pharmacist. He highlighted that the pharmacist has not examined the patient and may choose a product based on commercial incentives. He suggested that patients should retain a choice between generic and branded medicines.

Justice Mehta observed that an informed patient could always ask for a branded medicine containing the same formulation if the doctor had prescribed the formulation.

Kulshresthra also raised concerns about substandard and spurious medicines and sought stronger punishment for violations. However, the Court observed that prescribing the quantum of punishment was a policy matter for the government.

Additional Solicitor General KM Nataraj submitted that the Union government was not treating the proceedings as adversarial and would consider areas where the existing system could be improved. He referred to the Pradhan Mantri Bhartiya Janaushadhi Pariyojana as an existing initiative for providing medicines at lower prices. The Court, however, asked what patients requiring medicines unavailable at Janaushadhi Kendras would do.

Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal, appearing for the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance, submitted that manufacturers were not selling medicines at high prices and that retailers were earning huge profit margins. Justice Mehta, however, pointed out that manufacturers fix the MRP.

The Court kept the matter on September 29 to hear the submissions of Sibal and Union of India.

Learned District and Session Judge Sh. Jatinder Singh Jamwal appointed/posted as Secretary, Department of Law and Justice, UT of Ladakh.

JAMMU, Sep 16: The Double bench of High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh has expressed serious concern over deficiencies in Government healthcare infrastructure and took note that 346 out of 620 sanctioned faculty posts at Government Medical College Srinagar are vacant.

A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Dr Pushpendra Singh Bhati and Justice Rajnesh Oswal made the observations while hearing CPPIL No. 3/2017 in PIL No. 21/2015, a continuing public interest matter concerning medical facilities in Government hospitals.

eNyaya Sarathi: J&K Law Department’s Digital Initiative to Make Legal Services More Accessible
In-house application brings case search, court information, Assembly matters and citizen assistance onto a single digital platform
Srinagar: The Department of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Jammu & Kashmir, has developed an in-house digital application, eNyaya Sarathi, aimed at making legal information and departmental services more accessible to citizens across the Union Territory.
Among its key features, eNyaya Sarathi provides a consolidated case-search facility covering multiple courts across Jammu & Kashmir through a single interface. The application also offers information relating to the locations of different courts across the Union Territory, along with access to Assembly-related matters.
A notable feature of the application is its interactive chatbot, through which citizens can seek responses to their legal queries and obtain relevant legal information.The platform is designed to serve as a convenient digital gateway for citizens seeking legal information.
The initiative also reflects the Department’s broader emphasis on accessible, transparent and technology-driven public services, bringing essential legal and institutional information closer to citizens through a single digital platform.
With eNyaya Sarathi, the Department seeks to leverage technology to facilitate easier access to legal resources, improve citizen engagement and make the delivery of information more convenient, particularly for those who may otherwise need to undertake physical visits to government offices.
eNyaya Sarathi thus represents a step towards a more citizen-centric and digitally accessible legal-information ecosystem in Jammu & Kashmir.
Dwonload link

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=gov.jk.enyayasarathi

Passports (Amendment) Rules, 2026